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Employment Division v. Smith:
Overlooking the Middle Ground in Free

Exercise Analysis
INTRODUCTION

The Neo-American Church, led by Chief Boo Hoo, considers
some psychedelic substances, such as marijuana and LSD, sacramental foods and the true "Host of the Church." As such, the
church imparts a duty upon its members, the Boo Hoos, to partake
of such sacraments on a regular basis.' Similarly, the Native American Church regards peyote, another psychedelic substance, as a
sacramental component of its ceremonies. Legend holds that eating
the plant gave an Aztec woman the strength to escape the desert,
beneath circling vultures, and return to her tribe; upon hearing her
tale, the tribe's spiritual leader decreed the plant a "blessing" and
said that it must be given to everyone.2 A Jehovah's Witness
asserted that her faith required her to let her nine-year-old child

walk the streets of Brockton, Massachusetts, selling copies of spiritual literature for five cents apiece, in violation of the state's child
labor laws. 3 Another Jehovah's Witness relied upon prayer, in
accordance with her religion's tenets, to cure her four-year-old
daughter when the girl developed flu-like symptoms. After seven'See United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 443 (D.D.C. 1968).
2 See John S. Nelson, Native American Religious Freedom and the Peyote Sacrament:
The PrecariousBalance Between State Interests and the Free Exercise Clause, 31 AR=. L.
R v. 423, 423 (1989).
Numerous cases have examined restrictions on or treatment of "unusual" religious
practices. See Employment Div. v. Smith, -U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (holding
that the Free Exercise Clause does not bar a state from prohibiting sacramental peyote use);
Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics & Dangerous Drugs, 459 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding
that an exemption regulation, from which the Church of the Awakening was excluded,
created an arbitrary classification that could not withstand due process analysis); People v.
Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (holding a California statute that proscribed
the use of peyote unconstitutional, since it would prevent an Indian tribe from using peyote
as a sacramental symbol); State v. Big Sheep, 243 P. 1067 (Mont. 1926) (holding that while
laws cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may inhibit acts or
practices that tend toward subversion of the civil government or that are made criminal by
the law of the land).
I See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 163 (1944).

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

[VOL. 80

teen days without medical treatment, the child died of acute pu4
rulent meningitis.
The examples range from the absurd to the horrifying. Rarely
do the beliefs of "other" religions seem justified in the face of
widely acknowledged state interests or even in light of basic common sense. As a result, free exercise jurisprudence looks less like
the grand constitutionalism that legal scholars wish it to be and
more like a continuing exercise in ridiculousness. Combined with
the inappropriateness of judicial evaluation of a particular adherent's sincerity and the importance of his or her belief, this condition
has led to a re-thinking of established free exercise analysis.
In Employment Division v. Smiths (Smith I), the United States
Supreme Court confirmed this change by refusing to recognize a
constitutionally mandated exemption to Oregon's drug laws for the
religious use of peyote. In that case, the Court faced the issue of
whether the state of Oregon could, consistent with the Free Exercise
Clause, prohibit the use of peyote for sacramental purposes as part
of its general prohibition of peyote use. The Court held, in a 6-3
decision, that the state did not have to provide a religion-based
exemption from its drug laws for the respondents, who were members of the Native American Church. However, the choice of free
exercise analysis divided the Court more closely. Four justices
dissented from the majority holding, which substantially narrowed
the "compelling interest" requirement set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner.6 This requirement had been, in name if not actual deed,
the relevant inquiry in free exercise cases. In its place, the Smith
II majority held, "[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion ... is
...

merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and

otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended." ' 7 Thus, apparently the Smith II majority rationale would
find a state law constitutionally infirm only if the enacting state
were, in the words of Justice O'Connor, "so naive as to enact a
'8
law directly prohibiting or burdening a religious practice as such."
Part I of this Note surveys the history of the religion clauses.
Part II examines the status of modern free exercise jurisprudence
prior to the decision in Smith II. Part III analyzes both the majority

4 See Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 855, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1988).

5
6

8

- U.S. -,
110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) [hereinafter Smith I].
374 U.S. 398 (1963); see infra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
Smith II,
-U.S.
at
, 110 S. Ct. at 1607 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1608.
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holding and Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Smith II. Part IV
gives an assessment of the current state of free exercise jurisprudence. The Note concludes by suggesting an alternative approach
that the Court could have adopted in Smith IL
I.

THE FmsT A mNDMENT, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, AND FREE

ExERcISE: AN OVERvIEw
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
9This provision,
containing the so-called "Establishment Clause" and the "Free
Exercise Clause," dually constrains the power of both the federal
government and state governments 0 to regulate or otherwise become involved in religious matters in virtually any non-neutral
way." The Establishment Clause "forestalls compulsion by law of
the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship.' 2 Likewise, the Free Exercise Clause "safeguards the free
exercise of [one's] chosen form of religion. '1 3 The Court has
stated: "The values underlying these two provisions ... have been

zealously protected, sometimes even at the expense of other interests of admittedly high social importance."' 4 The tension inherently
existing between the protections of the religion clauses and the
powers of government creates tremendous interpretive problems.
The history of the religion clauses has been analyzed in an
attempt to gain clues for proper interpretation."5 However, it has
been determined that "there is no clear history as to the meaning
of the clauses.' ' 6 While Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
fought for "total religious freedom and an end of governmental
aid to religion,"117 others were also instrumental to the actual

9 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
10The First Amendment has been applied to state government action via the Foureenth Amendment. See generally JomH E. Now x ET A., CoNsn-tmoNA LAW § 10.2 (3d
d. 1986).
" See id. § 17.1.
2

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).

"3Id.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
's See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
ercise of Religion, 103 HAsv. L. Rav. 1410 (1990). See generally NowAx, supra note 10,

7.2.
16NowAx, supra note 10, § 17.2.
17Id.
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ratification of the Bill of Rights. 8 Indeed, some states had established churches at the time of ratification and clearly would not
have disapproved of equally allocated federal aid to religions.1 9
Because this historical background is largely "ambiguous, and
[because] many of today's problems were.., never envisioned by
... the Framers," 20 most of today's Establishment Clause and
Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence is a result of modem interpretation rather than historical analysis.
The Free Exercise Clause has been described as prohibiting
government "from interfering with or attempting to regulate any
citizen's religious beliefs, from coercing him to affirm beliefs repugnant to his religion or conscience, and from directly penalizing
or discriminating against him for holding beliefs contrary to those
held by anyone else."' One of the earliest decisions from the
United States Supreme Court concerning the Free Exercise Clause
was Reynolds v. United States.? In Reynolds, the Court held that
a Mormon's religious beliefs did not provide a constitutional basis
for an exemption from federal laws prohibiting polygamy. This
decision, as well as several others that followed soon afterwards,
appears to have been based on a distinction between laws that
burden conduct and laws that burden beliefs.? However, the Court
later recognized, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,24 that "the Amendment embraces both concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to
act."'' z While the Court stated that the freedom to act, unlike the
freedom to believe, was not absolute, 6 the Cantwell decision established that a law may run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause b3
regulating an adherent's actions even though it may not regulat
any belief as such.
II.

MODERN FREE EXERCISE JURIPRUDENCE

Modern free exercise jurisprudence focuses largely on "exeml
tions from generally applicable laws, since this [poses] the mc
toSee id.
10 See id.
2DLAtURENcE H. TRuE,AmmICAN CoNsTruToNAL LAW

§ 14.3 (2d ed. 1988).
16A Am. JuR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 471 (1979).
- 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
23 See NowAx, supra note 10, § 17.7.
310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding that defendant's conviction for breach of peace, I
on playing a phonograph record that condemned certain religious organizations on a s
violated defendant's constitutional rights of religious liberty and freedom of speech).
13Id. at 303.
16See id. at 303-04.
21
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important interpretative issue."
free exercise debate:

27

Two basic views illustrate this

Under the no-exemptions view, the free exercise clause exists
solely to prevent the government from singling out religious practice for peculiar disability .... The remedy is to strike down the
offending legislation ....
Under the exemptions view, on the
other hand, the free exercise clause protects religious practices
against even the incidental or unintended effects of government
action. The evil includes not only active hostility, but also majoritarian presuppositions, ignorance, and indifference. The remedy generally is to leave the government policy in place, but to
carve out an exemption when the application of the policy im2
pinges on religious practices without adequate justification. 8
Conflict arises between the two views only when a generally applicable law burdens a religious practice, since a law that is not
generally applicable-i.e., a law that is aimed directly at religious
beliefs or practices and substantially burdens such beliefs or practices-would be clearly unconstitutional under either view.
Sherbert v. Verner2 provided the basis for modem free exercise
analysis by adopting the "compelling interest" standard for evaluation of religious exemption claims. In Sherbert, the appellant, a
Seventh-Day Adventist, had been fired for refusing to work on
Saturday, the Sabbath day in appellant's faith. Because of her
refusal to work, appellant was denied unemployment benefits by
the state of South Carolina. The Court held that a "compelling
state interest" must be present to justify the "substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right"3 0 presented by the
state's action. If no compelling interest were shown, such an infringement would be unconstitutional. The Court adopted this
standard despite the fact that the eligibility provisions of the unemployment compensation statute appeared to be generally applicable.
Basically, the Sherbert decision established a free exercise analysis whereby a court would balance free exercise interests on one
hand and state interests on the other. However, the balance would
tip in favor of the free exercise interests unless the state interest
reached a "compelling" level. Such a standard essentially "parallels

, McConnell, supra note 15, at 1415.
a Id. at 1418.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
10Id. at 406.
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the strict scrutiny inquiry the Court uses in reviewing the purported
infringements of the most fundamental constitutional rights."3 1 As
the Court in Sherbert said: "[11n this highly sensitive constitutional
area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests,
' 32
give occasion for permissible limitation.'
While the Sherbert test is easily stated, its application in subsequent cases has yielded inconsistent results.33 The Court has
consistently applied Sherbert in cases involving the denial of unemployment benefitsY It also used Sherbert to uphold a religionbased objection to state compulsory education laws in Wisconsin
v. Yoder.35 However, these cases represent the only forceful applications of the Sherbert standard. In other cases that have rejected
free exercise claims, the asserted state interest has appeared less
than "compelling.1 3 6 Some decisions have found the Sherbert standard inapplicable due to the presence of particular facts.3 7 These
inconsistencies warrant an analysis of some of the major decisions
that have attempted to use the "compelling interest" standard.
Wisconsin v. Yoder35 is the only decision outside the unemployment benefits context to find a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause based on a Sherbert analysis. Yoder dealt with Amish
parents whose religious beliefs dictated that their children not
attend secondary school. Nonattendance violated the state's compulsory education laws. The Amish argued that compulsory edu-

3, William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CAsE W. REs. L. R v. 357, 365-66 (1989-90).
32Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (second alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
3 See Marshall, supra note 31, at 366.
See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding the
denial of unemployment benefits to a worker that refused to work on Sunday due to
religious beliefs violative of the Free Exercise Clause); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding Florida's refusal to award unemployment benefits
to Seventh-Day Adventist that was fired because she refused to work on her Sabbath
violative of the Free Exercise Clause); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding
Indiana's denial of unemployment compensation benefits to worker that quit job for
religious reasons after being transferred to department producing military weapons violative
of First Amendment right to free exercise of religion under Sherbert v. Verner).
11 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
" See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252 (1982); see infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
37 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988);
Bowen v. Ray, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); see infra
notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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cation beyond the eighth grade infringed upon their religious beliefs,
placing the children in "an environment hostile to Amish beliefs[,]
... and... [taking] them away from their community.., during
'39
the crucial and formative adolescent period of life."
The Court in Yoder used a two part balancing test similar to
the one used in Sherbert. First, the Court looked for and found a
substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. Second, this
burden was balanced with the interests of the state-interests that
' 4
had to be "of the highest order and . .. not otherwise served."
Unlike other free exercise decisions purporting to use a compelling
interest standard, Yoder reached the result one would expect when
using such a standard-it found the state interest in providing
education beyond the eighth grade insufficient to justify the burden
on free exercise.
One important note about the opinion in Yoder remains: it
relied not only upon the respondents' free exercise rights but also
upon their rights as parents to direct "the upbringing and education
of [their] children." ' 41 The Court stated: "[W]hen the interests of
parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim ... , more
than merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the [s]tate' is required" 42 to justify the state law.
While the Court did not state that this higher standard would not
be required in a case involving only a free exercise claim, the above
quoted language has been interpreted by some, including Justice
Scalia in Employment Division v. Smith, 43 to restrict Yoder in that
manner. The idea of the restriction is that if a generally applicable
law infringes on more than one protected right, it is subject to
closer scrutiny than if it infringes on only one right; because a law
infringes on two rights, a state should have to meet a higher
standard to sustain it. Regardless of the merits of this argument,
the distinction has led some people to conclude that Yoder "is so
tied to its facts that it is without strong precedential value.""4
Besides Yoder and Sherbert, only three decisions have used the
compelling interest standard to uphold a free exercise claim. These
three cases, Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Secu-

19Id. at 211.
,a Id. at 215.
4' Id. at 233.
42

Id.

U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) [hereinafter Smith Il; see infra notes 71131 and accompanying text.
4 Marshall, supra note 31, at 367.
"
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rity,45 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,41and Thomas
v. Review Board,47 all involved claims for free exercise exemptions
from a state unemployment compensation statute, making them
"essentially Sherbert re-visited." ' 48 Therefore, due to Yoder's
"hybrid ' 49 nature and the "narrow context of unemployment
5
benefits ' 50 of Frazee, Hobbie, and Thomas, some commentators '
and judges 52 have come to view Sherbert as having little remaining
precedential force.
United States v. Lee53 and Hernandez v. Commissioner,5 4 purported to use the Sherbert standard but found sufficient justification for the burdens on free exercise involved. In Lee, an Amish
employer refused to withhold social security taxes from his employees' paychecks or otherwise participate in the federal government's social security tax program. The employer argued that
participation in the social security system would violate his religious
beliefs.55 The Court decided that "the government's interest in
assuring mandatory and continuous participation in and contribution to the social security system ' 56 was a compelling or "overriding" interest.57 However, as Justice Stevens's concurrence has been
described as pointing out, "[E]xempting Amish employers from
payment of social security taxes easily could have been accomplished without detriment to the social security system. 51 8 According to Justice Stevens, the true threat lay in the difficulty of
"processing other [religious] claims to tax exemption, ' 59 rather
than the actual claim at hand. Therefore, the real interest in Lee
could be seen as one of administrative convenience, something that
generally has not been considered "compelling" in other casesA0

1
,8

489 U.S. 829 (1989).
480 U.S. 136 (1987).
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
Marshall, supra note 31, at 367.
41 See Smith II,
-U.S.
at -,
110 S. Ct. at 1602.
10McConnell, supra note 15, at 1417.
1' See Marshall, supra note 31, at 365-72; McConnell, supra note 15, at 1416-18.
52 See Smith II,
-U.S.
at -,
110 S. Ct. at 1602-03.
53 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
- 490 U.S. 829 (1989).
"

See Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254-55 (1982).

- Id. at 258-59.
11Id. at 257-60.
59Robert Kamenshine, Scrapping Strict Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4 CoNsT.
COmMENTARY 147, 149 (1987) (discussing Justice Stevens's concurrence).
5" Lee,

455 U.S. at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

60See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that according
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In Hernandez, after enunciating the Sherbert compelling interest standard, the Court based its rejection of a free exercise claim
on the precedent established by Lee. Hernandez, like Lee, found
that the government had a compelling interest in protecting its tax
system from the administrative difficulties of accommodating "a
wide variety of religious beliefs." ' 61 Thus, both cases offer sufficient
governmental interests that seem to be somewhat less than compelling, in light of precedent, but that are labeled "compelling"
by the Court. This fact has led some commentators to conclude
that the Court, while nominally retaining Sherbert's strong language, has backed away from the compelling interest standard in
actual practice. 62

Since Sherbert, some free exercise cases have avoided the Sherbert standard by creating exceptions to or otherwise "find[ing] a
way out" 63 of it. In Bowen v. Roy 6 and Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association,65 the Court created an exception
to the traditional Sherbert analysis by holding that the Free Exercise
Clause "does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct
of the Government's internal procedures." 66 The Court was not
explicit in either decision as to whether it based this statement on
a finding that the internal procedures of government create a
"compelling interest," or whether an objection to such internal
procedures takes the case out of the usual Sherbert analysis. If the
former is true, then presumably the Court applied Sherbert's compelling interest standard, albeit in an arguably "diluted" fashion.
If the latter is true, then the First Amendment is not even implicated when one objects to the functioning of the government's
internal procedures. The Sherbert analysis would never even come
into play in such a case.

differential treatment to male and female members of the uniformed services for the sole

purpose of achieving administrative convenience violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment). For a discussion of the compelling interest standard, see Stephen E.
Gottlieb, Compelling Government Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Consti-

tutionalAdjudication, 68 B.U. L. Rnv. 917 (1988).
11Hernandez,

-U.S.

at

-

, 109 S. Ct. at 2149 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 260).

See Kamenshine, supra note 58, at 147-50; Marshall, supra note 31, at 368-69.
6Kamenshine, supra note 58, at 147.
" 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting American Indian parents' religious objection to
federal government assignment of a social security number to their daughters).
62

- 485 U.S. 439, 108 S.Ct. 1319 (1988) (rejecting objections to clearing of government

timber land considered sacred by American Indian tribes.).
" Bowen, 476 U.S. at 700.
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The Court also "[found] a way out"6 7 of the traditional Sherbert analysis in Goldman v. Weinberger6 and O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz.69 In Goldman, the Court held that the military could
prohibit a serviceman from wearing religious apparel despite his
religious objections to such a policy. In O'Lone, the Court decided
that prison officials did not have to accommodate inmates' wishes
to attend Muslim ceremonies held on prison grounds. In both cases,
the Court held that traditional deference to the judgments of these
respective government institutions (the military in Goldman and
the prison officials in O'Lone) allowed rejection of free exercise
claims" that might otherwise be upheld. Again, the Court avoided
the strict scrutiny of Sherbert by finding exceptions to the general
rule.

III.

EMPLoYMENT DivwszoN v. SMIH

As can be discerned from the foregoing discussion, free exercise
71
jurisprudence prior to Employment Division v. Smith (Smith II)
lacked a great deal of clarity and consistency.7 2 Smith II appears
to be an attempt by one part of the Court to remedy this condition
and to restrict the "compelling interest" analysis of Sherbert v.
Vernere3 to a very narrow category of cases.
The Smith litigation began when Alfred Smith and Galen Black,
respondents in the case, were fired from their jobs with a private
drug rehabilitation center because they ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic drug. When respondents applied for state unemployment
benefits from Oregon, they were refused because of a state statute74
that deemed persons fired for work related "misconduct" ineligible
for such benefits. They sought review of this refusal, arguing that
application of the Oregon statute violated their rights to free exercise of religion. 5 The Oregon Supreme Court agreed, holding
that the state's interest in preserving the financial integrity of the
67Kamenshine, supra note 58, at 147.
-8 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
482 U.S. 342 (1987).
See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987); Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986).
_ -. U.S.
_, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) [hereinafter Smith II].
72See supra part II.
- 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
74This law was OR. Ray. STAT. § 657.176(2) (1989).
71Respondents were members of the Native American Church, which considers peyote
to be a sacrament. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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the burden
unemployment benefit fund was inadequate to justify
76
imposed on respondents' free exercise of religion.
7 and conThe United States Supreme Court granted certiorarP
cluded, in Smith I, that "if a State has prohibited through its
criminal laws certain kinds of religiously motivated conduct without
violating the First Amendment, it certainly follows that it may
impose the lesser burden of denying unemployment compensation
benefits to persons who engage in that conduct. ' 78 The case was
remanded for a determination of whether respondents had violated
the relevant Oregon Criminal Statute. 79 On remand, the Oregon
Supreme Court held that although respondents' ingestion of peyote
did violate Oregon's criminal statute, application of the criminal
statute to the religious use of peyote was unconstitutional." Then,
1 to decide the
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
ultimate issue-whether the Free Exercise Clause "permits the State
of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the
reach of its general criminal prohibition on the use of that drug."' '
If the criminalization of the religious use of peyote was constitutional, then, under the Court's previous holding, the denial of
unemployment benefits based on the same actions would be constitutional as well.
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Smith II, which
concluded that Oregon's criminal prohibition of the religious use
of peyote was constitutional. 83 Justice Scalia's opinion was joined
by four other justices, 84 while Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring
opinion. While Justice O'Connor's opinion concurred in the result
of the case (holding Oregon's criminalization of the religious use
76See Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445 (Or. 1986), vacated, 485 U.S. 660
(1988).
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 480 U.S. 916 (1987).
7 Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 670 (1988) [hereinafter Smith 1].
OR. REv. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1989). This statute made it unlawful (punishable up
to a Class B felony) for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled
substance, unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of professional practice. See 21

U.S.C. § 812 (1988) for a list of controlled substances, as determined by Congress, that
was subsequently adopted by the Oregon legislature.
'* See Smith v. Employment Div., 763 P.2d 146, 150 (Or. 1988), rev'd, -U.S.
-_,
110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
11See Employment Div. v. Smith, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
2

Smith II,
See id. at

-U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 1597.
-, 110 S. Ct. at 1599-1603.

94 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, Justice White and Justice Stevens joined
the majority opinion.
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of peyote constitutional), it differed from the majority opinion on
the means of reaching this result. The majority opinion refused to
use Sherbert's compelling interest analysis; 5 Justice O'Connor argued that the Sherbert analysis provided the appropriate decisional
framework.8 6 After applying the compelling interest analysis, Justice
O'Connor agreed that the state law was constitutional. 7 Justice
Blackmun's dissent8 8 agreed with Justice O'Connor's opinion concerning the test to be used but reached a different result in its
application. 9
A.

Justice Scalia'sMajority Opinion

Justice Scalia's majority opinion began by distinguishing the
facts of Smith II from those of Sherbert and the other unemployment benefit cases.9 While those decisions "held that, a State could
not condition the availability of unemployment insurance on an
individual's willingness to forgo conduct required by his religion,
... the conduct at issue in those cases was not prohibited by
law." 9' The opinion implied that the facts of Smith II would fit
squarely under Sherbert if the use of peyote were not illegal.
However, since Oregon's criminal law did prohibit the use of
peyote, Smith I established that the state could constitutionally
deny unemployment benefits for the same criminally proscribed
behavior as long as the criminal prohibition was not itself unconstitutional. 92 Thus, the underlying illegality of respondents' peyote
use in Smith II was "critical," as it distinguished that case from
the unemployment benefit cases, which did not involve illegal behavior.93
The remainder of Justice Scalia's opinion was divided into two
parts: the first part established what the majority considered to be
the proper analysis for these types of cases, and the second part

9"

See discussion infra part III.A.
See Smith II, -U.S. at
, 110 S.Ct. at 1606-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See id. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 1613-15 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

"

Justice Blackmun's dissent was joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall.

, 110 S. Ct. at 1615-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
"See Smith II, .U.S. at (finding Oregon's criminal prohibition of the religious use of peyote unconstitutional).
91See supra notes 29-31, 45-52 and accompanying text (discussing those cases).
91Smith II, -.. U.S. at ,110 S. Ct. at 1598.
See id. at

, 10 S. Ct. at 1598-99.

91For example, the behavior in Sherbert upon which the unemployment benefits
denial was based was the claimant's refusal to work on Saturdays. Unlike the use of peyote,
refusal to work Saturdays is obviously not a criminal violation.
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explained why the Sherbert compelling interest standard was not a
part of this analysis.94
Justice Scalia began the first part by acknowledging that the
Free Exercise Clause protects not only beliefs but also the performance of or abstention from religiously motivated physical acts.
Consequently, a state could not "ban such acts or abstentions only
when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of
the religious belief that they display." 95 Justice Scalia asserted,
however, that in Smith II, respondents wished "to carry the meaning of [the Free Exercise Clause] one large step further."' ' Such a
step would bring generally applicable laws with incidental effects
on free exercise within the prohibitions of the First Amendment.
This result, Justice Scalia concluded, was not what the Court's free
exercise precedents had establishedY
Justice Scalia conceded that some prior decisions had sustained
objections to generally applicable laws that burdened religiously
motivated conduct. However, these cases "involved not the Free
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction
with other constitutional protections." 9 8 As discussed previously, 99
the state law in Wisconsin v. Yoder infringed not only on the
respondents' free exercise rights, but also on their rights as parents
"to direct the education of their children."'1' In addition, Justice
Scaila pointed to Cantwell v. Connecticut and other cases' 01 that
upheld free exercise claims but also involved elements of freedom
of speech and press.l °2 Because the present case did not "present
such a hybrid situation," 03 the general rule-that generally appli-

- See Smith II,

-U.S. at - , 110 S.Ct. at 1599-1606.
Id. at __
,110 S. Ct. at 1599.
- Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1599.
" Justice Scalia stated: "We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State
is free to regulate." Id. at -,
- Id. at

110 S.Ct. at 1600.

, 110 S. Ct. at 1601.

" See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
II, -..
U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 1601.
other cases cited were Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) and
Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
112See Smith II, ._U.S.
at , 110 S. Ct. at 1601. For a discussion of cases
involving elements of both free exercise and free speech, see William P. Marshall, Solving
the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REa. 545 (1983)
(arguing that free exercise claims for exemptions from generally applicable laws should be
resolved under the speech clause).
103
Smith II,....- U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 1602.
1"0 Smith

M'The
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cable laws with incidental burdens on religion do not offend the
Constitution-applied.
The second part of Justice Scalia's majority opinion addressed
respondents' contentions that their claim for a free exercise exemption from the Oregon law must be evaluated under Sherbert's
compelling interest standard. After an examination of the free
exercise decisions that followed Sherbert, Justice Scalia concluded
that the Sherbert precedent had little life "beyond the unemployment compensation field.""" The distinction between cases in this
field and others is that the unemployment cases involve a state
system with individual exemptions already in place. Therefore,
according to Justice Scalia, a state "may not refuse to extend [the
exemptions of] that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without
a compelling reason."' 0 5 Because most other laws involved in free
exercise claims, including criminal prohibitions such as the one in
Smith II, do not already contain a system for individual exemptions, these laws do not require a Sherbert-type analysis. As a
result, the majority opinion concluded "that the sounder approach,
and the approach in accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to such challenges."' °6
Interestingly, while the majority concluded that the Sherbert
test was "inapplicable" to the facts of Smith II, Oregon had not
made such an argument in its briefs to the Court.1 7 Indeed, the
state considered "[tihe starting point for the analysis [to be] the
settled principle that ... religious conduct must give way to re-

gulations that serve public interests of compelling importance."'' 0 8
The state's argument focused not upon the proper framework
within which to evaluate the case but rather upon the "compelling"
nature of the government's interest in criminalizing the use of
peyote.' °9 The state did argue at one point that the Supreme Court
had never allowed "exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability when those laws directly serve health, safety or public
order interests." 110 However, this statement did not appear to be
1o4
Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 1603. For a discussion of the Sherbert standard in
modem free exercise jurisprudence, see supra notes 33-70 and accompanying text.
' Smith II,
-U.S.
at , 110 S. Ct. at 1603.

Id., 110 S.Ct. at 1603.
The State of Oregon filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, a Brief for Petitioners
and a Reply Brief for Petitioners before the United States Supreme Court.
,M'
Brief for Petitioners at 11, Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith,
._U.S.
, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (No. 88-1213) (emphasis added).
109
See id. at 11-16.
110Id. at 16.
"o
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a suggestion that the Court abandon the Sherbert analysis when
evaluating generally applicable laws. Rather, the statement was
part of the state's more narrow argument that its compelling interest "in controlling and eliminating drug use"'' would be compromised by allowing individual exemptions for the religious use
2
of peyote."
B. Justice O'Connor'sConcurrence and Response to the
Majority
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority
that Oregon could prohibit the religious use of peyote constitutionally, by way of its general prohibition of the drug's use." 3 She
dissented vigorously, however, from the Court's refusal to apply
the Sherbert balancing test to the question." 4 She considered the
state's interest in the case to be "compelling"" ' 5 and believed,
therefore, that the same result reached by the majority could be
reached under the Sherbert analysis without "depart[ing] [needlessly] from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence.""' 6
Justice O'Connor's disagreement with the majority concerning
the Sherbert test's applicability stemmed from what she regarded
as the Court's "strained reading of the First Amendment" and
"disregard [for the] consistent application of free exercise doctrine
to cases involving generally applicable regulations that burden religious conduct. ' 11 7 A law that prohibited religiously motivated
conduct would surely implicate First Amendment concerns, regardless of whether the prohibition was the incidental effect of a
generally applicable law or the intentional effect of a law directed
towards a particular religious practice."" Moreover, "a State that
makes criminal an individual's religiously motivated conduct burdens ... free exercise ... in the severest possible manner," since
the individual must 'either abandon[] his religious principle or
fac[e] criminal prosecution."'' ' 9 Therefore, Justice O'Connor ar-

' Id. at 36.
11 See id. at 16-36.

M3See Smith II,
11

See id. at

-,

-U.S.

at -

, 110 S. Ct. at 1606 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

110 S. Ct. at 1607-13.

'sId., 110 S. Ct. at 1607-13.
"I Id. at

. 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
Id. at
, 110 S. Ct. at 1607.
See id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1608.

19Id. at

-,

110 S. Ct. at 1610 (emphasis added) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366

U.S. 599, 605 (1961) (plurality opinion)).
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gued, the Court's holding that the Free Exercise Clause was not
implicated by burdens from a generally applicable criminal law was
clearly wrong.
Justice O'Connor argued further that the Court's holding reduced free exercise protections to a level no greater than that
provided by the Equal Protection Clause. 12° The majority would
seem to find free exercise implications only in "laws aimed at
religion,"' 2' and, presumably, such laws would violate the Equal
Protection Clause as well. The fallacy of the Court's holding was
evident: "As the language of the Clause ... makes clear, an
individual's free exercise of religion is a preferred constitutional
activity.'"12 Therefore, the protections in the Free Exercise Clause
must be distinct from those in the Equal Protection Clause.'23
Justice O'Connor asserted not only that generally applicable
laws burdening religion may trigger First Amendment concerns,
but also that such laws demand strict scrutiny under the traditional
Sherbert analysis. According to Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia's
majority opinion looked at the results, rather than the language,
of the Court's recent free exercise decisions in concluding that the
Sherbert precedent had little remaining strength./24 Justice O'Connor rejected the idea of "judg[ing] the vitality of a constitutional
1
doctrine by looking to the win-loss record of the plaintiffs."' 2
Instead, she looked to the language of the prior decisions, which,
26
in her view, "affirmed [the Sherbert] test as a fundamental part"'
of the Court's free exercise jurisprudence. Moreover, Justice
O'Connor argued that the cases cited by the majority as evidencing
the rejection of Sherbert were easily distinguishable from Sherbert.
Therefore, failure to apply the Sherbert analysis in those cases did
not signal a rejection of the analysis itself. 27

See id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1608.
121Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1612.
'= Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1612.
'I'

See id., 110 S. Ct. at 1612.
id. at -, 110 S. Ct. 1609-10; supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
For a general discussion of the Court's recent free exercise decisions, see supra notes 45-70
and accompanying text.
- Smith II,
U.S. -,
110 S. Ct. at 1611 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11 Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1611.
1- See id. at.-, l10 S. Ct. at 1611-12. Justice O'Connor distinguished the following
cases from Sherbert: Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693
(1986); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). For a discussion of these cases, see
supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
124See
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Finally, Justice O'Connor attacked the majority's suggestion
that "the disfavoring of minority religions is an 'unavoidable consequence' under our system of government and that accommodation of such religions must be left to the political process."' 28 In
her view, the purpose of the Bill of Rights was to place certain
subjects beyond the control of majoritarian politics. The First
Amendment accomplished this purpose in the area of religion, and
Sherbert's compelling interest standard reflected that protection.
Therefore, Justice O'Connor concluded, to reject the compelling
interest test was to reject the mandate of the First Amendment and
29
thus "denigrate '[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights.""11

IV.

FEE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE AF=ER SmT II

In Employment Division v. Smith130 (Smith II), the Court held
that generally applicable laws that result in incidental burdens on
religion do not arouse First Amendment concerns. In other words,
neutral laws-laws that do not intend to burden the free exercise
of religion-do not implicate the First Amendment. Therefore,
"intent" will become a key factor in the analysis of free exercise
claims after Smith II.13 Justice Scalia's opinion indicated that the
Court will require evidence that the government intended to burden
a religious belief or practice before it will entertain any free exercise
objection. 32 On the other hand, Justice O'Connor would consider
intent irrelevant, since, under her approach, neutral laws would
trigger the same compelling interest analysis that laws with "intent"
33

do.1

Basically, the Court in Smith II did for free exercise claims

34
what it did for equal protection claims in Washington v. Davis.
In Washington, the Court held that an equal protection claim

required a showing of discriminatory intent. Therefore, a law that

-U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
S. Ct. at 1613 (alteration in original).
110U.S. -,
110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) [hereinafter Smith 11].
M'See Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654, 670 (D. Minn.
1990) (relying on Smith 11 in upholding zoning ordinance that excluded churches because
there was no anti-religious intent behind the statute).
M This is true in all cases except those in the "unemployment benefits" context. See
In Smith II,
129Id., 110

supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text. For cases such as these, the Smith II opinion
appears to leave intact the Sherbert compelling interest analysis as the relevant inquiry. See
Smith II, -U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 1595.
See supra part III.B.
" 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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had a disproportionate impact in its application would not violate
the Equal Protection Clause, if this impact was not the product of
discriminatory intent. 35 Thus, the decision in Smith II comports
with the rule in Washington by holding that a burden on free
exercise will not violate the Free Exercise Clause, if the burden is
not intentional.
One problem with the approach in Smith II is that while the
Court offers convincing reasons as to why generally applicable laws
should not be evaluated under a strict scrutiny standard, 3 6 these
reasons do not lead necessarily to the conclusion that such laws
should receive no scrutiny whatsoever. In his examination of free
exercise decisions after Sherbert v. Verner, Justice Scalia stated:
"Although we have sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test
...
Iwe have always found the test satisfied.' ' 37 While this may
suggest that the "strict scrutiny" nominally applied in those cases
was not really very "strict," it does not suggest necessarily that
the Court refused to apply any scrutiny at all. Therefore, the
"approach in accord with the vast majority of [the Court's]
precedents '1 38 may not be what Justice Scalia concludes it to be.
A second problem with Justice Scalia's opinion involves his
distinguishing the situation in Smith II from that in Wisconsin v.
Yoder.139 He stated that strict scrutiny was appropriate in Yoder
because that case, unlike the present one, involved the infringement
of two fundamental rights1 40 However, if the facts of Yoder were
changed slightly, the result would change under Justice Scalia's
analysis. If, for example, the children were somehow able to sue
on their own behalf, or if they had a guardian appointed to them
for purposes of the suit, the presence of the "extra" fundamental
right of parents in rearing children would disappear. Would the
Court still allow Amish children an exemption from compulsory
school attendance? Although this appears to be virtually the same
case, under the Smith II precedent the children would lose. It
seems curious that a child suing on his own behalf could not
prevail on a free exercise claim while if his parents brought suit
for him, they would prevail.

I' See

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
"I See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
"3 See Smith II,
-U.S.
at , 110 S. Ct. at 1602.
138 Id. at ....
, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
139 406
"4

U.S. 205 (1972).

See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
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Another problem with the Smith II approach involves Justice
Scalia's argument that strict scrutiny would be improper in cases
involving generally applicable laws because it would require a judge
to evaluate the centrality or importance of a particular religious
practice. If the test were so applied, a burden upon any religious
practice, no matter how insignificant, would have to be justified
by a compelling government interest.' 41 Justice Scalia asserted that
such judicial evaluation would be wholly inappropriate. 42 Since
strict scrutiny could not be applied properly without this evaluation, and because the evaluation itself would be unacceptable,
Justice Scalia concluded that strict scrutiny simply should not be
applied in cases involving generally applicable laws.
There are at least two flaws in this argument. First, the same
argument could be made with respect to laws that are iitended to
burden or prohibit a particular religious practice, as opposed to
laws that are generally applicable. Justice Scalia argued that "dispensing with a 'centrality' inquiry is utterly unworkable" in cases
involving generally applicable laws because, for example, to do so
"would require ...

the same degree of 'compelling state interest'

to impede the practice of throwing rice at church weddings as to
impede the practice of getting married in a church."' 43 However,
this statement is no less true when the impeding law targets the
religious practice. Therefore, the logical extension of his argument
would be to abandon strict scrutiny for cases involving intended
religious burdens as well since the scrutiny required would necessarily require such judicial evaluation. Surely, even Justice Scalia
does not believe that laws targeting a religious practice are not
deserving of strict scrutiny.
The second flaw centers around Justice Scalia's view that judicial evaluation of the "importance" or "centrality" of a particular religious practice is inappropriate. This argument is based
partially on the belief that a judge must accord a certain degree of
respect to all religions.' 44 The idea is that such an evaluation
- See Smith II,
,,2
See id. at .,
,41
Id. at
"

-

110 S.Ct. at 1605 n.4.
U.S. at __
110 S. Ct. at 1604-05.

, 110 S. Ct. at 1605 n.4.

Another basis for Justice Scalia's idea may be that evaluating the importance of a

religious practice would lead ultimately to governmental preference of one religious practice

over another-a result that would arguably violate the Establishment Clause. One possible
response to this concern would be by way of Laurence Tribe's "zone of permissible

accommodation" theory, whereby government action that is arguably forbidden by the
Establishment Clause but compelled by the Free Exercise Clause is permissible. See TRIBE,
supra note 19, § 14-4, at 116869.
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possibly would underestimate the religious "importance" of a particular practice, thus denigrating the practice and the religion itself.
Hence, Justice Scalia concluded that a process involving such an
evaluation should be abandoned. However, in abandoning this
process (strict scrutiny analysis), Justice Scalia reaches the same
practical result as would be obtained by repeatedly adjudging burdened religious practice to be "unimportant." Either way, the
complaining individual finds no protection for his or her rightsan outcome that the individual would probably view as less desirous
than the evaluation itself.
This principle may be illustrated by analogizing to an artist
that is told that payment will be made upon completion of an
"acceptable" work of art. However, when the artist seeks payment
after finishing the work, he is told that it is inappropriate and
disrespectful to judge such a personal matter as one's artistic
expression. Therefore, the artist receives nothing. Likewise, when
a free exercise plaintiff goes into court looking for protection of
his free exercise rights, Justice Scalia tells him that judicial evaluation of his religious belief is inappropriate. Thus, the free exercise
plaintiff gets nothing as well. It would seem that neither the artist
nor the free exercise plaintiff would mind undergoing an "evaluation" in such a situation, if doing so were necessary to protect
his rights.
While judicial evaluation of the importance of a religious practice may not be desirable, Justice Scalia's response-abandoning
strict scrutiny-misses the mark. Perhaps the Court should recognize that the inappropriateness of such an evaluation is outweighed
by the interests of free exercise and, therefore, accept the process.
As the majority opinion points out, both Justice O'Connor and
the dissenting Justices struggled with the problem as well. 45 Acceptance of the process, though painful, may be the only choice.
While Justice Scalia's arguments in Smith 1I do not necessarily
compel the result he reached, neither do Justice O'Connor's arguments compel the result she reached. Justice O'Connor focused
her efforts on refuting the majority's position that generally applicable laws do not implicate First Amendment concerns. While these
arguments give forceful reasons to provide at least some protection
of free exercise in such situations, they do not compel the conclusion that such protection should reach the level of a compelling

"'

See Smith II,

"U.S. at

-,

110 S. Ct. at 1605 n.4.
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interest test. In addition, while Justice O'Connor referred to language from prior free exercise decisions that recited the compelling
interest standard, she ignored the "watered down" application of
that standard in those cases. A close look at the decisions shows
that while the Court used the rhetoric of Sherbert's strict scrutiny,
the actual scrutiny applied was on a lower level.' 46
At this point, the reader may wonder: If Justice Scalia's use
of no scrutiny is wrong and Justice O'Connor's use of strict
scrutiny is wrong, what analysis should the Court use? Perhaps
the answer can be found in the Court's approach to another kind
of protection embodied in the First Amendment-the protection
of free speech. Government regulations that infringe on freedom
of speech can be either "related to the suppression of free expression" or "not related to expression."' 147 This distinction is the same
as the distinction in Smith 11 between laws that are "generally
applicable" and laws that target a religious practice. Both distinctions, like the distinction in Washington v. Davis,'48 are based on
the presence of "intent.' ' 49 It would seem appropriate, however,
for the court to apply the same test in the areas of free exercise
and free speech, two First Amendment protections which are viewed
as closely related and sometimes even coextensive,' 50 rather than in
the areas of free exercise and equal protection.' 5'
In the free speech realm, if a government regulation is "related
to expression," the Court will apply strict scrutiny when evaluating
the government's interests.5 2 On the other hand, if the regulation
is not related to expression, the Court will apply "the less stringent
standard ... announced in United States v. O'Brien."'53 In such

" See supra notes 45-70 and accompanying text; see also Kamenshine, supra note 58,
at 154.
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989).
'"426 U.S. 229 (1976).
" See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.

110
William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MnN. L. REv. 545 (1983). See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981)

(holding student use of school facilities for religious worship and discussion to be "forms
of speech and association protected by the First Amendment); Heffron v. International

Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 652 (1981) (holding religious solicitations at a state fair to be protected "speech").
- For a comparison of free exercise rights to free speech rights and equal protection
rights, see Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S.

Constitution, 18 CoNN. L. REv. 739, 761 (1986).
See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403.
- Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). In O'Brien the Court
"1

stated:
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a case, O'Brien requires that the regulation considered be supported
by an "important or substantial governmental interest," and that
the burden on free speech be "no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest."'15 4 Clearly, the standard is, by its
language and by subsequent interpretation,'55 more of a "middletier standard"1 56 than a "strict scrutiny" standard. Arguably, this
standard should apply to generally applicable laws in free exercise
cases as well as to those in free speech cases.
Professor Kamenshine has argued for the use of O'Brien's
middle level scrutiny in free exercise cases. He has asserted that if
the defendant in O'Brien, who was arrested for burning his draft
card, had taken such action due to religious motivations rather
than free speech motivations, it would have been illogical for the
Court to reach a different result. 57 Additionally, Professor Kamenshine has argued that the "watered down" strict scrutiny applied by the Court in post-Sherbert cases'58 was, in actuality, this
middle level standard. 5 9 Such points would well have been heeded
by the Justices in Smith II.
In Smith II, Justice O'Connor hinted at the inherent similarity
between free speech analysis and free exercise analysis. Arguing
against the majority's approach, she cited O'Brien for the principle
that "neutral regulations that affect free speech values are subject
to a balancing, rather than categorical, approach."'' 6 However,
while she suggested that the Court use a balancing approach in
free exercise cases, Justice O'Connor did not consider the possibility of using O'Brien's middle level scrutiny rather than Sherbert's
strict scrutiny test.
Adoption of a middle level scrutiny test in free exercise cases
for generally applicable laws would fit well into Justice O'Connor's

[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial

governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
,14O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
M'See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403.
"4 Kamenshine, supra note 58, at 154.

See id. at 152.
,52
See supra notes 45-70 and accompanying text.
" See Kamenshine, supra note 58, at 154.
100

Smith II,

-U.S.

at

,

110 S. Ct. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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argument. She argued convincingly against the majority's position
that a generally applicable law having incidental burdens on free
exercise would not implicate First Amendment concerns. Nevertheless, even if such laws do implicate the First Amendment, it seems
inappropriate that the government should have to provide the same
level of justification for a generally applicable law as for a law
that is aimed at the suppression of free exercise. Here, Justice
O'Connor's argument weakened. Use of a middle level scrutiny in
such a scenario would strengthen Justice O'Connor's argument.
Justice Scalia's position also would be bolstered by the adoption of a middle ground. While he argued persuasively against the
use of strict scrutiny, his opinion, like Justice O'Connor's, weakened as he stretched this point to the conclusion that no scrutiny
whatsoever was appropriate. 61 Again, adoption of middle level
scrutiny would remedy this weakness.
CONCLUSION

Free exercise jurisprudence has never been clear or consistent,
and one of its most debated issues has concerned the proper
approach for evaluating the constitutionality of generally applicable
laws. The Supreme Court attempted to establish a definitive stance
in Employment Division v. Smith' 62 by holding that generally applicable laws will not implicate the Free Exercise Clause. However,
as the concurring and dissenting opinions to that case show, the
debate still rages.
The use of no scrutiny for generally applicable laws that burden
free exercise makes for easy application, but it fails to accord the
degree of protection to religious practices that the First Amendment.
requires. The use of strict scrutiny, on the other hand, affords
ample, but probably too much, protection. A survey of recent free
exercise case law shows a lack of strong support for either approach. 163 For these reasons, one must conclude that the Justices
in Smith I!-not just Justice Scalia and the rest of majority, but
also the Justices in the concurring and the dissenting opinionswere wrong.
What is now needed is a compromise position. Adoption of a
middle level scrutiny test would comport with precedent and pro-

262

See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.

"6

- U.S.
-, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
See supra notes 45-70 and accompanying text.
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vide a meaningful level of protection for religious practices burdened by generally applicable laws. In addition, the approach
would remedy some of the concerns expressed by Justice Scalia
and by Justice O'Connor in Smith I. Finally, such an approach
would be compatible with the approach used to evaluate contentneutral regulations that burden freedom of speech. A quick look
in the direction of United States v. O'Brien'64 would reveal that
the polar extremes of Smith H are simply not the only possibilities.
William L. Montague, Jr.

1- 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

